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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant David D. Smith ("Smith") appeals the District Court's denial of 
attorney fees and costs against Washington County (the "County"). The underlying 
action involved a complaint for mandamus against the County related to Smith's 
application for a building permit. Smith first filed a Notice of Appeal on November 12, 
2008, appealing a verbal decision made October 27, 2008, by Washington County 
District Judge, Stephen Drescher. Smith stated in his Notice of Appeal that "[tlhis appeal 
is only of the denial of attomey's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code $812-121 and 
12-1 17." This Court thereafter entered an Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal on the 
basis that there was no final written appealable Order or Judgment from which a Notice 
of Appeal may be filed. A Final Order was then entered on February 18, 2009.' 
Apparently this written Final Order was entered so that Smith would have something to 
appeal from.' On March 13,2009, Smith filed an Amended Notice ofAppeal specifically 
appealing that certain decision of October 27,2008, and that Final Order dated February 
18,2009, both so entered by the district court.3 Smith contends the district court erred in 
The Final Order dated February 18, 2009 addressed both the County's Motion to Reconsider, related to the 
underlying holding of the District Court, as well as the attorney fees issue. The Final Order was "bare bones", 
addressing only the lack of a Eivolous defense by the County, that Idaho does not follow the English rule on 
attorney fees, and that "[tjhere is no contractual or applicable statute upon which to base attorney fees." R. Vol. 1 p. 
120-121. 
The District Court's verbal order made October 27,2008 stated that Idaho follows the American rule on attorney 
fees, and that counsel for Smith ''correctly states that 12-1 17 and 12-120 have both set forth a threshold on which 
one may secure fees. In this court's view, they both rise to the level of frivolity, and there is no construction of these 
facts that I can h d  that the County defended frivolously in any means, it's just a matter of confusion (inaudible)." 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 37, L. 23 - p. 38, L.ll). 
It should be noted that Smith's Amended Notice of Appeal also apparently limited the scope of appeal wherein it 
stated "[tlhis appeal is only of the denial of attomey's fees and costs pursuant toIdaho Code §$12-121 and 12- 
117." (R. Vol. 1 at 125). 
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failing to award attorney fees. The County submits that the district court erred, initially, 
in ordering the County to make a decision on Smith's application for a building permit, 
and thereafter rendering Smith's complaint for mandamus a petition for judicial review. 
Even if the district court did not so err in these procedural holdings, however, the County 
submits that the district court was correct in its refusal to award Smith his requested 
attorney few. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On September 14,2007 the Washington County Planning and Zoning Administrator (the 
"Administrator") was presented with an application from Smith requesting a variance to the 
requirement that the driving surface of his access road be twenty (20) feet for certain real 
property located in rural Washington County, Idaho. Smith requested that he be given a building 
permit despite the Midvale Fire District's position that no building permit be granted until the 
road accessing the property has a twenty (20) foot driving surface. (R. Vol. 1 at 45.) A public 
hearing was scheduled by the Washington County Planning and Zoning Commission (the 
"Commission") on October 16, 2007. (R. Vol. 1 at 22).Tne hearing was continued until 
November 20,2007 to obtain comment from the representatives of the Midvale Fire District. (R. 
Vol. 1 at 22). After the hearing was closed, the Commission voted to deny Smith's requested 
~ar iance.~ Smith then appealed to the Board of County Commissioners (the "Board"). (R. Vol. 
Neither the clerk's minutes nor a transcript f?om these meetings were included in the record on the so-called 
Petition for Judicial Review below nor are they included in the Record on Appeal. Indeed, the district court failed to 
order the preparation of a record and transcripts when it deemed Smith's complaint for mandamus and various 
motions a Petition for Judicial Review, as required by Rule 84(0 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. Vol. 1 
at 58 - 59). 
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Since a public hearing was already afforded Smith before the C o d s s i o n ,  the Board did 
not hold a public hearing on the variance but met with Smith on January 7, 2008.' The Board 
then scheduled its decision at its regularly scheduled meeting on January 22,2008. At that time 
the Board asked for a legal opinion regarding the request.6 That opinion was pending when 
Smith filed his Complaint for Mandamus Relief and Other Relief on February 29, 2008. (R. 
Vol.1 at 6). At the time Smith filed his Complaint, the Board had not made a decision on 
Smith's Application for Variance. The County filed an Answer to Complaint for Mandamus 
Relief and AfJirmative Defenses on March 19, 2008, denying that Smith was entitled to the 
mandamus relief sought and stating affirmative defenses of failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies, failure to include indispensible parties (the Midvale Fire District) and that Smith is not 
entitled to the building permit under applicable ordinances and regulations. (R. VoI. 1 at 13 - 
16). On March 31, 2008 Smith filed a Motion for Order Requiring the County to Immediately 
Grant Building Permit. (R. Vol.1 at 2). The district court heard arguments on Smith's motion 
on April 14, 2008, and on April 16, 2008 the district court entered an Order Directing the 
n e r e  was extensive discussion about this meeting in the hearing on October 27,2008. (Tr. Vol. 1. p. 27, L. 24 - 
p. 29, L. 6). As will be d~scussed below, when seeking a variance, the Washington County Code (VCC") only 
requires a hearing before the Commission, not both the Commission and the Board. Nevertheless, both Smith and 
his neighbor were allowed to testify extensively about the requested variance at the January 7,2008 Board meeting. 
Notably, however, the minutes and transcript of this meeting were not included in the Record on Appeal. 
The Board requested an opinion from the Washington County Prosecutor's office. Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
Bert L. Osborn responded to the request of the Commission in a letter dated April 10, 2008. Attached to Mr. 
Osborn's letter was a letter dated July 25,2007 written by John C. Keenan, Deputy Attorney General, addressed to 
the Honorable Lawerence Denney regarding the Midvale Fire Protection District. Although neither letter is included 
in the Record on Appeal, the A.G. opinion was inserted almost word for word into the Board's Amended Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions and Order beginning at paragraph 19 on page 47 of the Record on Appeal and ending with 
paragraph 56 on page 54 of the Record on Appeal. The A.G. opinion is also mentioned by Mr. Osbom in the 
October 27, 2008 hearing. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 30, LL. 3-14 and p. 37, LL. 7-10). It is not completely clear wby Speaker 
Denny requested the A.G. opinion. 
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Washington County Commissioners to Enter It's Decision on Plaintzffs Application for Building 
Permit within 14 days of the date of the hearing.7 (R. Vol. 1 at 2). 
On April 28, 2008 the Board issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order 
CFindings of Fact") and filed an Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order rAmended 
Findings") on May 5,2008. * (R. Vol. 1 at 22 and 40). The Amended Findings denied Smith's 
requested variance &om the road width requirements of the Midvale Fire District. (R. Vol. 1 at 
56). As an alternative, the Amended Findings informed Smith of his right to petition the 
Midvale Fire District for a variance. (Id.) The record does not indicate whether or not Smith has 
petitioned the Midvale Fire District for a variance. However, on May 23, 2008 Smith filed a 
Second Motion for order Requiring the Counly Immediately Grant Building Permit. (R. Vol.1 at 
3). 
On May 27, 2008 the district court heard arguments on Smiths Complaint and First and 
Sewnd Motions for relief. (Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 13 - 24). The district court found there was an 
alternative remedy at law and that mandamus relief was not appropriate at the time. (R. Vol. 1 at 
58 - 59). The District Court then sua sponte modified Smith's barrage of legal pleadings into a 
petition for judicial review, ordered that Smith's Motion was to be deemed an appeal and set up a 
briefing schedule. (R. Vol.1 at 58 - 59). Both parties thereafter filed responsive briefs and 
agreed to a decision by the District Court without further oral argument. The district court 
entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on September 5, 2008, reversing the Board's 
The district court stated: "I think this is clearly a situation contemplated by Title 7 where there is not otherwise a 
lcoown remedy, more than 56 days have elapsed, no  decision has been made. A writ of Mandate will issue ..." (TI. 
Vol. 1,p. 12, LL. 11-15). 
The only change made in the Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions and Order was the insertion of the word 
"met" in paragraph 65 on page 17, (R. Vol. 1 at 56). 
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denial of the building permit and variance, and remanding the matter for entry of a permit andlor 
va~iance.~ (R. Vol. 1 at 61 - 65). 
The County filed a Motion to ~econsider" on September 15,2008, requesting the district 
court reconsider its finding that the County acted arbitrarily and capriciously. (R. Vol. 1 at 2). 
The County submitted that it was legally obligated to enforce the International Fire Code and the 
requirements of the Midvale Fire District related to the driveway requirements. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 
27, LL. 23). The County also submitted that there was no failure to provide Smith with a public 
hearing and therefore no denial of Smith's due process rights. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 27, L. 24 - p. 29, L. 
8). ShortIy after the County filed its Motion to Reconsider, Smith filed a Motion for Attorney's 
Fees and Costs (R. Vol. 1 at 66 - 78) along with a Memorandum in Support of Attorney's Fees 
(R. Vol. 1 at 84 - 102) and supporting affidavits for attorney fees and costs. (R. Vol.1 at 79 - 
83, and 103 - 106, and 107 - 110). On October 27,2008 the district court heard arguments on 
the County's motion to reconsider and Smith's request for attorney fees. The district court 
denied the County's Motion to Reconsider and denied Smith's Motion for Attorney's Fees and 
Costs. (R. Vol. 1 at I1 1 - 1 12; Tr. Vol. 1, p. 34, L. 13 - p. 35, L. 9; Tr. Vol. 1, p. 37, L. 22 - p. 
Despite the absence of a written final order, Smith filed a Notice ofAppeal on November 
12, 2008, appealing the district court's denial of his request for an award of attorney fees and 
costs under Idaho Code $4 12-1 17 and 12-121 (R. Vol. 1 at 113 - 115). As set forth above, this 
Court entered an Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal on November 24,2008, on the grounds 
The district court's September 5, 2008 Memorandum Decision and Order is included in the Record on Appeal; 
however, Smith's citation refers to the Clerk's Register of Actions rather than pages 61-65. (R. VoI. 1 at 61-65). 
ID The County's Motion to Reconsider is not included in the Record on Appeal. 
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that the appeal was not taken from a written, final appealable order as required by 1,A.R. 1 I .  (R. 
Vol. 1 at 118). Thereafter, on February 18,2009, the district court entered its Final Order, which 
denied Smith's request for attorney fees. (R. Vol. 1 at 120 - 123). Smith thereafter filed his 
Amended Notice of Appeal, again appealing only the district court's denial of attomey fees under 
Idaho Code $5 12-117 and 12-121. (R. Vol. 1 at 124- 128). 
C. Factual Background 
1. Preliminary Statement on Factual Background 
The factual background for this case is limited because neither the Commission's nor the 
Board's deliberations at public hearings or decision hearings were included in the Record on 
 peal.'' Smith's Statement of Facts appears to takes some liberties with the facts by including 
some factuaI assertions that the County was unable to find anywhere in the Record on  peal.'^ 
Other factual assertions by Smith are taken directly from Appellant's original Complaint. In the 
factual background below, the County has attempted to include only those facts included in the 
Record on Appeal.13 
" As will be argued herein below, the County contends that in order for this Court to exercise de novo review of the 
attorney fees issue under Idaho Code 5 12-117, it was "the responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient 
record to substantiate [his] claims on appeal." Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 127, 937 P.2d 434, quoting 
Chenoweth v. Sanger, 123 Idaho 189. 191,846 P.2d 191,193 (1993). 
Two examples are as follows: Appellant's Brief, page 9, last paragraph, asserts that the Midvale Rural Fire 
District's fue chief is a road builder by profession and benefits directly by the increased cost of driveway 
construction. Appellant's Brief, page 9, third full paragraph, asserts that the County sought to require Smith "to 
build his driveway in excess of the width of nearly half the roads maintained by the public in Washington 
County,. . .". The County cannot f&d these facts anywhere in the Record on Appeal. 
l3 The County has chosen, however, to reference in the footnotes of this brief some information regarding the 
documents which are not included in the Record on Appeal on the basis that such documents were produced in a 
sworn affidavit by Smith in the district court proceedings and are therefore presumably not in dispute and 
nevertheless helpful to this Court because they are discussed throughout the Record on Appeal. 
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2. Disputed Facts 
Apparently during the fall of 2006 Smith built a barn and driveway without applying for 
a building permit.'4 (R. Vol. 1 at 8, paragraph IV). Around that same time, Smith reviewed the 
Washington County code to determine the proper avenue for construction of his driveway, b m ,  
and residence. (Id.) According to Smith, his driveway was fully in compliance with the width, 
turn-outs, and grade required by the Washington County code. ( I d )  The County finds these 
factual assertions very intriguing and has again reviewed the WCC to see where Smith wuld 
have found this information and how he could have come to the conclusion that he had fully 
complied with the width requirements, particularly without applying for a building permit until 
after the driveway and barn were already constructed. 
The only reference to road width in the WCC relevant to Smith's projects are found in 
WCC 5-3-4.0 and WCC 5-3-523.1 and 2. The reference in these sections to the width of a 
finished roadway surface is twenty feet (20') "or must meet the standards of the fire department 
having jurisdiction, if more stringent." WCC 5-3-5.B. 1 and 2. Nowhere in the WCC does it 
state that a sixteen foot (16') road would be fully in compliance with the County's general 
zoning requirements. Other than these sections of the WCC, and the relevant definition of 
driveway within the WCC, the road width requirements for a driveway such as the one sought to 
be constructed by Smith are determined by the local fire districts. The relevant WCC defmition 
of "driveway" is found in section 5-2-1, wherein it defines "DRIVEWAY: A private lane serving 
as access from a public road or street to no more than two (2) homes." WCC 5-2- 1. From there, 
a reading of the WCC leads to WCC 5-3-4D which reads: "Access requirements are as follows: 
l4 Smith's recitation of the facts and proceedings in his Complaint state that he built a barn on bis property in 2006. 
However, the County has no records relating to a building permit for the barn. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 5, L. 8 -p. 7, L. 7). 
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No building permit for a residence will be issued in any zone unless the private road or driveway 
serving the residence meets the standards of section 5-3-5 of this chapter." WCC 5-3-4D. The 
next and last relevant section relating to driveways is found in WCC 5-3-5.B.2, which provides: 
A11 private driveways serving two (2) houses shall have a 
recorded easement of at least twenty six feet (26') with twenty feet 
(20') of finished roadway meeting county or road district standards 
for road construction, excluding paving, or must meet standards of 
the fire department having jurisdiction, if more stringent. WCC 5- 
3-5B.2. 
I It is unclear from these sections how Smith came to the conclusion that a sixteen foot (16') 
I 
I 
I driveway fully complied with the WCC. 
I The County presumes that Smith obtained the information which suggested some areas 
i allow sixteen foot (16') roads in a handout which was mentioned by Smith's attorney in the May 
I 
I 
1 27, 2008 hearing.'' (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 17, LL. 8-13). In spite of having this handout, Smith claims 
I 
I "they're talking about an unwritten rule apparently." (Tr. Val. 1, p. 16, LL. 2-5). Smith's brief 
I 
I further claims there exists an unwritten policy "to require a residential owner to get permission 
from the local fire district in order to grant a building (Appellant's Brief, p. 8). In 
spite of claiming that the requirement to meet with the local fire district was an ''unwritten 
policy", Smith met with the Midvale Fire District two times. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 34, LL. 4-5, and 
Is The County has used this handout from the Fie  Disnicts for many years; however, since Smith's attorney 
references and paraphrases the handout in the May 27,2008 hearing, the County believes it would be helpful to this 
Court to recite the relevant portion of the handout verbatim: 
"V, Width of Road. 1. Road serving one residence, or serving Agricultaral 
outbuildings, shall have a drivable surface at least: Midvale 20' Wide. 
Weiser 16' Wide. Cambridge 16' Wide. More than a single residence 
requires 20' of drivable surface in all jurisdictions." (TI. p. 17, LL. 8-13). 
16 AE has been standard procedure in the County for many years, an applicant for a building permit receives a 
handout, the front page of which provides: "Requirements to Auulv for a Buildinx Permit You must provide the 
Washington County Planning & Zoning Office with the following before a building permit can be issued: 1. Septic 
Permit:. . .2. F i e  Dept. Permit: Obtained £ram Rurd Fire Department.. . .Weiser.. . .Midvale (208) 355-2375, and 
Cambridge.. .." 
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Appellant's Brief pp. 7-8). To his dismay, "the District rehsed to grant permission to Smith to 
have a driveway 16 feet in width." (Appellant's Brief p. 8). 
It was Smith's disagreement with the County's interpretation of the WCC regarding the 
width of his driveway that led to hearings before the Commission, an Idaho Attorney General 
opinion on the issue, md litigation. Smith insisted that his review of the WCC guided him to 
build a driveway sixteen feet (16') wide. Once the driveway was already constructed, Smi th  
claims it would cost an additional $25,000 to add an extra 4 feet to his driveway. (Appellant's 
Brief p. 9). Instead of adding the 4 feet, he sued the County. 
In summary, Smith built a sixteen foot (16') driveway and barn based upon his own 
review of the WCC without obtaining a building permit. Later, when he sought a building 
permit for a residence, he was informed that he needed to have a twenty foot (20') driveway 
pursuant to applicable ordinances and regulations of the County. Smith then incurred nearly 
$23,000 in attorney fees in an effort to avoid having to add an extra four feet (4') to his driveway 
at an alleged cost of over $25,000. (Appellant's Brief p. 9). 
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11. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether Smith's Complaint for Mandamus Relief and Other Relief was ripe at 
the District Court level? 
B. Whether Smith exhausted all his administrative remedies before filing his 
Complaint for Mandamus Reliefand Other Relief, which was sua sponte changed 
to a judicial review by the District Court? 
C. Whether Smith has presented the Court with an adequate record for de novo 
judicial review? 
D. Whether the district court properly denied Smith his requested attorney fees under 
Idaho Code $5 12-117,12-120(3) and 12-121? 
111. ATTOREY FEES ON APPEAL 
A. Is the County entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code 5 12-1 17 (1 and Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules? 
N. ARGUMENT - ADDITIONAL ISSUED PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Prior to addressing the merits of Smith's attorney fees arguments, the County believes it 
would be appropriate to address issues relating to the jurisdiction of the District Court to hear the 
Complaint for Mandamus Relief and Other Relief, the exhaustion by Smith of all administrative 
remedies, the adequacy of the record for judicial review, and whether Smith was required to 
include the Midvale Fire District as an indispensable party. 
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A. Smith's Complaint For Mandamus Was Not Ripe. 
As stated in the Record on Appeal, Smith filed his Complaint for Mandamus Relief and 
Other Relief (the "Complaint") on February 29,2008. At the time Smith filed the Complaint, the 
County was in the process of obtaining a legal opinion regarding his request, and had not issued 
its decision on Smith's application. The Board did not make its final decision until April 28, 
2008, following the district court's order requiring the issuance of a decision. (R. Vol. 1 at 6 and 
22). However, Smith was not entitled to a writ of mandate compelling issuance of a building 
permit or variance. 
Smith's Complaint was filed pursuant to Idaho Code 8 7-301, et seq., which governs 
writs of mandate. Idaho Code 7-302 sets forth under what conditions a writ of mandate will 
issue: 
[A writ of mandate] may be issued by the supreme court or any 
district court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person, 
to compel the performance of an act which the law especially 
enjoins-as a d& resulting from office, trust or station; or 
compel the admission of a party to the use and the enjoyment of a 
right or office to which he is entitled, and from which he is 
unlawfully precluded by such inferior tribunal, corporation, board 
or person. 
Under this section, this Court has held that mandamus will not lie unless the party seeking it has 
a clear legal right to have done that for which he seeks the writ and unless it is the clear legal 
duty of the officer(s) to act. Freeman v. McQuade, 80 Idaho 387, 390,33 1 P.2d 263 (1958). It 
has also long been the rule in Idaho that mandamus will not lie to coerce the discretion of an 
inferior tribunal. Id.; see also, McCuskey v. Canyon County, 123 Idaho 657,663, 851 P.2d 953 
(1993).; Brady v. Cify oflfomedale, 130 Idaho 569,944 P.2d 704 (1997). 
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In McCuskey, a landowner who desired to build a gas station/convenience store on his 
property challenged Canyon County's amendment of its zoning ordinance and filed a complaint 
seeking a writ of mandate compelling the County to issue him a building permit. Although this 
Court agreed with McCuskey's challenge to the County's amendment of its zoning ordinance, it 
nevertheless declined to allow the issuance of a writ of mandate. 123 Idaho at 663. In doing so, 
this Court stated, 
It is well-established that a writ of mandate will not issue to 
compel the performance of a discretionary act. As I.C. $ 67-6519 
gives counties the discretion to grant or deny an application for a 
permit authorized or mandated by the Local Planning Act of 1975, 
a writ of mandate is not available to compel the issuance of such a 
permit. (internal citations omitted). 
Implicit in McCuskey is a fmding that a building permit is one of the permits authorized by the 
Local Land Use Planning Act ("LLUPA"). More recently, in Taylor *: Canyon County Bd. of 
Comm'rs, 147 Idaho 424, 210 P.3d 532, 543 (2009), this Court acknowledged that a building 
permit is a permit authorized by LLUPA, Idaho Code $67-6517. 
Like the plaintiff in McCuskey, Smith sought a writ of mandate to compel the County to 
issue him a building permit. However, like McCuskey, Smith was not entitled to a writ of 
mandate because the County had discretion under LLUPA to decide whether to issue the 
permit.'7 The district court's Order Directing the Washington County Commissioners to Enter 
l7  Similarly, the Board had discretion to issue Smith his requested variance, pursuant to WCC 5-18-4 and Idaho 
Code 5 67-6516. The latter statute provides, "A van'ance shall not be considered a right or special privilege, but 
mav be granted to an applicant only upon a showing of undue hardship because of characteristics of the site and that 
the variance is not in conflict with the public interest." (emphasis added). None of the provisions in the WCC 
relating to variance requests remove the Board's discretion to deny a variance or impose a time limit. The only time 
limit is the forty five (45) days imposed in on the Commission. 
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It's Decision on Plaintzfs Application for a Building Permit effectively constituted a writ of 
mandate in \r;olation of Idaho Code 9 7-302 and should not have been issued.18 
The district court erred both when it ordered the Board to make a decision on Smith's 
building permit and/or variance requests, and when it deemed Smith's Complaint to be a petition 
for judicial review. The district court should have dismissed Smith's Complaint because the 
decision of whether to issue the building permit or grant the variance request were entirely 
discretionary decisions imputed to the Board. The County followed the proper procedure for 
processing applications for variance. The Complaint was not ripe and should have been 
dismissed. 
B. Smith Did Not Exhaust All His Administrative Remedies Before Filing His 
Complaint For Mandamus Relief And Other Relief. 
As set forth previously, Smith's application for a building pennit falls under the auspices 
of LLUPA. With the enactment of LLUPA, the legislature clearly intended to give local 
governing bodies broad powers in the area of planning and zoning. Worley Hwy. Dist. v. 
Kootenai County, 104 Idaho 833,663 P.2d 1135 (Ct. App. 1983). Original jurisdiction to decide 
such issues does not rest in the district court, Jerome County e rel. Board of Comm'rs v. 
Holloway, 118 Idaho 681, 799 P.2d 969 (1990); therefore, if a court "allows a suit to be 
maintained prior to such final determination, it interferes with the subject matter jurisdiction of 
another tribunal." Pounds v. Denison, 115 Idaho 381,383,766 P.2d 1262,1264 (Ct. App. 1988), 
citing County of Contra Costa v. State of California, 177 Cal.App.3d 62, 222 Cal.Rptr. 750 
(1986). By compelling the issuance of a building permit without the benefit of the County's 
'' In fact, the district court described the order as a writ of mandate in its oral d i g  at the April 14,2008 hearing on 
Smith's motion: "A writ of mandate will issue to the Washington County Commission to make decision within 14 
days, and there will be judicial review thereof if necessary." (TI. Vol. 1, p. 12, LL. I5 - 18). 
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complete review of the application, the district court interfered in the Board's decision in 
violation of the requirements of LLUPA. 
LLUPA provides that "[aln applicant denied a permit or aggrieved by a decision" of a 
governing board may within twenty-eight (28) days after all remedies have been exhausted under 
local ordinances seek judicial review under the provisions of Idaho Administrative Procedures 
Act (IDAPA), Chapter 52, Title 67, Idaho Code. See Idaho Code $67-6519(4); See also Idaho 
Code $67-6521(1)(d)I9. Idaho Code § 67-5271 provides that a person is not entitled to judicial 
review of an agency action until that person has exhausted all administrative remedies. Thus, 
only after exhaustion of remedies under LLUPA and under local ordinances may an unsuccessful 
applicant or an affected person seek judicial review. Palmer v. Board of Control, 117 Idaho 562, 
790 P.2d 343 (1990). 
In White vs. Bannock County Comm'rs, 139 Idaho 396,80 P.3d 332 (2003), a landowner 
filed a complaint in district court challenging the approval of a conditional use permit ("CUP") 
by the Planning and Development ~ouncil .~ '  The landowner had originally filed an appeal with 
the Commissioners prior to the Council's written decision approving the CUP. However, the 
landowner did not pay the required costs for the appeal and failed to pursue the appeal with the 
Commissioners. It was eventually dismissed by the County for lack of action. Despite its 
sympathy for the landowner, the Court found that the failure to appeal the Council's decision to 
l 9  Pursuant to Idaho Code 567-6521, an affected person is "one having an interest in real property which may be 
adversely affected by the issuance or denial of a permit authorizing development." 
20 The Planning and Development Council referred to in the decision is the functional equivalent of the County's 
planning and zoning commission. 
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the County Commissioners required a dismissal of the landowner's complaint seeking 
declarative relief to void the CUP?' The Court went on to reiterate that 
important policy considerations underlie the requirement for 
exhausting administrative remedies, such as providing the 
opportunity for mitigating or curing errors without judicial 
intervention, deferring to the administrative processes established 
by the Legislature and the administrative body, and the sense of 
comity for the quasi-judicial functions of the administrative body. 
White, 139 Idaho at 405, 80 P.3d at 341. 
In Regan v. Kooterzai County, 140 Idaho 721, 100 P.3d 615 (2004), the Regan's sought 
declaratory relief from the county planning director's interpretation of the county zoning 
ordinance as prohibiting the use of an airstrip on the Regan's property. Notably, the Regan's 
failed to appeal the planning director's interpretation to a hearing examiner pursuant to the 
county administrative appellate provision or thereafter file a petition for judicial review. The 
Court held that the Regan's failure to exhaust the available county administrative remedies 
deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment action. Since the 
action was filed as a result of the planning director's interpretation of the zoning ordinance, the 
issue should have been pursued through the county authorities' administrative appellate 
procedure and Idaho Code 8 67-6521. Until the full gamut of the administrative proceedings had 
been conducted, and all available administrative remedies had been exhausted, review of the 
county's decision could not be considered. 
Likewise, Smith did not exhaust all his administrative remedies before filing his 
complaint." At the time Smith filed his Complaint, there were at least two other available 
The court aclcnowledged the Council's nearly three-month delay in issuing its writfen findings and sympathized 
with the plaintiffs sense of urgency in trying to stop a potential asphalt and rack crushing operation. 139 Idaho at 
401, 80 P.3d at 337. Nevertheless, this Court held that White's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies 
precluded review by the district court. Id. 
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administrative remedies. First, as his application for a building permit was still pending before 
the Board, Smith could have waited for the decision of the Board. Second, Smith could have 
formally sought a variance from the Midvale Fire District. Only after obtaining a fmal decision 
on either of these actions could Smith seek judicial review of a denial of the building permit or 
variance. That Smith failed to take any of these actions is fatal to his requested relief. 
Clearly, when Smith filed his Complaint, he had also appealed the decision of the 
Commission to the Board. The Board had not yet made a decision. Even if he was unsatisfied 
with the delay by the Board when it sought an Attorney Genera1 opinion, his only recourse was 
to await the Board's decision and file a petition for judicial review. Instead, however, Smith 
bypassed the exclusive source of appeal for adverse decisions on a building permit (to the Board) 
by seeking a writ of mandamus. Nevertheless, Smith's Complaint was premature and should 
have been dismissed by the district court. 
C. Smith Has Not Presented The Court With An Adequate Record For De Noyo 
Judicial Review 
As noted throughout this brief, there are crucial documents and records of proceedings 
which were not included in the Record on Appeal. This Court has made clear that it was Smith's 
duty, as the appellant, to "provide a record adequate to support this claim of error. It is the 
responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient record to substantiate their claims on 
appeal." Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 127,937 P.2d 434 quoting Chenoweth v. Sangev, 123 
Idaho 189, 191, 846 P.2d 191, 193 (1993); see also, Bernard v. Ruby, 112 Idaho 583, 588-589, 
oomofe confinued/mnrpreviorlspi?ge) 
'The Countyraised the issue of failure to exhaust administrative remedies in &s Answer. (R. Vol. I at I5 - 16). 
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733 P.2d 804 (Ct. App. 1987). This Court will not presume error on appeal. Powell, 130 Idaho 
at 127. 
Where the issue on appeal relates solely to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code 
512-117, it necessarily involves some consideration of the underlying issue presented to the 
district court. Ralph Naylor Fams LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 810, 172 P.3d 1081, 
1085 (2007). In this case, Smith has appealed under Idaho Code $12-1 17 as well as various other 
statutory provisions for attorney fees. Therefore, it will be necessary for the court to exercise a 
free, or de nova review of the underlying issues presented to the district court, which includes the 
circumstances surrounding the Board's denial of Smith's building permit. Fischer v. City of 
Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349,356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005); Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and 
Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118, 90 P.3d 340, 343 (2004); Farrell v. Bd. Of Comm'rs, Lemhi 
County, 138 Idaho 378, 383, 64 P.3d 304, 309 (2002); Rincover v. State, Dept. of Fin. Sec. 
Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 548-49,976 P.2d 473,474-76 (1999). The following documents would 
therefore be necessary for this Court to exercise a free review of the underlying issues on appeal: 
- a transcript of or minutes from both hearings before the Commission, October 16, 
2007, and November 20,2007, including testimony given by the public and the 
Midvale Fire District; 
- a transcript of or minutes from the meeting Smith had with the Board on January 7, 
2008 where Smith's Counsel argues "[wle went to a hearing that they didn't hold" 
(Tr. Vol.1. p. 34, LL. 6-7); and 
- a copy of Smith's Affidavit referred to in oral argument wherein Smith's counsel 
claims he appealed to the Commission on January 21,2008. 
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It would also be helpful to this Court to have the following documents referred to by Smith's 
counsel, but not included in the Record on Appeal: 
- The handout mentioned and partially quoted by Smith's counsel in oral argument; 
- The building permit application; 
- The application for variance; 
Without the benefit of the foregoing documents, this Court is unable to make a 
determination that the district court erred in refusing to award attorney fees under Idaho Code $8 
12-117 and 12-121. 
Moreover, the district court failed to require the preparation of a transcript and record on 
the underlying so-called judicial review, as required by Rule 84(e) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 84(e) specifies, in part, that "judicial review of agency action shall be based 
upon the record created before the agency." I.R.C.P. 84(e). The district court did not order or 
otherwise require the preparation of the agency record before the County, including minutes and 
transcripts of meetings, letters or other testimony received in relation to the application, the 
application or any other documents constituting the agency record. Without these documents, 
this Court-like the district court-is unable to make any findings regarding the County's 
conduct. 
V. ARGUMENT - ATTORNEY FEES 
A. Although Smith Was The Prevailing Party, This Lawsuit Did Not Involve A 
Commercial Transaction And Thus Smith Is Not Entitled To Attorney Fees 
Under Idaho Code $12-120(3) 
At the outset, the County notes that neither Smith's frst Notice of Appeal nor his 
Amended Notice of Appeal raise the issue of the district court's failure to award attorney fees 
pursuant to Idaho Code 4 12-120(3), despite the fact that Smith raised the issue before the district 
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court. Regardless, Smith is not entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 5 
12-120(3) under any of the theories raised in his Opening Brief. 
Idaho Code 4 12-120(3) provides: 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account 
stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract 
relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, 
or services, and in any commercial transaction unless otherwise 
provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as 
costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defied to mean 
all transactions except transactions for personal or household 
purposes. The term "party" is defined to mean any person, 
partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the state 
of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
(emphasis added). Smith argues that he was the prevailing party, and because this was a 
commercial transaction, he is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code 5 12-120(3). Smith's 
argument is incorrect. 
In Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. v. Idaho Public Utilities 
Commission, 125 Idaho 401, 871 P.2d 818 (1994), plaintiffs sought relief against the Idaho 
Public Utilities Commission ("IPUC") for imposing impen@ssibly high fees for renewal of 
registration of Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) operating authority. Although this Court 
agreed with plaintiffs that the district court erred in its interpretation and application of 
applicabfe regulations, it a f f d  the district court's denial of attorney fees under Idaho Code 5 
12-120(3). As this Court aptly noted: 
LC. (j 12-120(3) allows for an award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party in a "commercial transaction." 
"Commercial transaction" is defined by the statute as all 
transactions except those for personal or household 
purposes. LC. 5 12-120(3). While the parties' activities 
here may be characterized as "commercial" as opposed 
to personal or household, there is nothing in their 
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dealings which may properly be characterized as a 
transaetion. This was simply the act of a legislative 
agency collecting a fee for services, enabling the fee 
payor to conduct its business. Although the activity may 
have resulted in some commercial impact on the motor 
carriers, this ciscumstance would not bring it within the 
meaning of "commercial transaction" as used in LC. $ 12- 
120(3). 
Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc., 125 Idaho at 408,871 P.2d at 825. 
(emphasis added). 
Likewise, in this case the County was collecting a fee for services enabling Smith-- 
assuming he met all other requirements--to proceed in building his home. Paying for a permit 
required by the County prior to constructing a home does not a "transaction" between Smith and 
the County make.23 
Smith's reliance on City of McCall v. Buxton, - Idaho , 201 P.3d 629 (2009), is 
also misplaced. In Buxton, the Court discussed the standard to be used by the district court in 
addressing attomey fees under Idaho Code $ 12-120(3) on remand. In doing so, the Court was 
simply clarifying that attorney fees are available under Idaho Code $ 12-120(3) in a legal 
malpractice action, which sounds in tort. Quite obviously, this matter does not involve legal 
mnalpractice-or any tort causes of action, for that matter. Therefore, any significance given to 
Bwcton by Smith is irrelevant. 
Smith also suggests that his application for a building permit constitutes a "contract 
relating to the purchase or sale of goods.. .or services" that entitles him to attorney fees under 
Idaho Code $ 12-120(3) This argument, too, lacks merit. The crux of Smith's claim is that his 
pennit is either a good or service provided by the County, paid for by him, which constitutes a 
23 This is particutarly true here, where the building permit was for the construction of Smith's residence. Idaho 
Code $ 12-120(3) specifically excludes "transactions for personal or household purposes" ftom the d e f ~ t i o n  of 
"commercial transaction." 
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contract between he and the County. To take Smith's argument to the extreme, if purchasing a 
building permit or other required permit or license from a governmental entity constitutes a 
contract, then every single transaction whereby a person pays for such permit or license 
constitutes a contract that would subject the governmental entity to attorney fees under Idaho 
Code 4 12-120(3). It cannot seriousIy be contended that the Legislature intended such a result. 
In short, Smith has not shown that Idaho Code $12-120(3) provides a statutory basis for 
an award of attorney fees. Accordingly, the district court did not err in failing to award Smith 
attorney fees under that statute. 
B. Smith Is Not Entitled To Attorney Fees And Costs Pursuant To Idaho Code 
$12-117 Because The County Acted Upon A Reasonable Basis In Law And 
Fact. 
1. Applicable Legal Standards 
Smith requested and was denied an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho 
Code 4 12-117(1) Idaho Code $ 12-117(1) provides, 
In any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as 
adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing 
district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party 
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if 
the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is 
rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
This Court's prior decisions interpreting this statute provide that fees must be awarded if the 
court finds (1) in favor of the person (Smith); and (2) that the County acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law. Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Lntah County, 144 Idaho 806, 808, 172 P.3d 
1081, 1083 (2007). This Court exercises free review over the decision of a district court 
applying Idaho Code 412-117. Fischer v. City ofKetchum, 141 Idaho 349,356, 109 P.3d 1091, 
1098 (2005); Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118,90 P.3d 340, 
343 (2004); Farrell v. Bd. Of Comm'rs, Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 383, 64 P.3d 304, 309 
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(2002); Rincover v. State, Dept. ofFin. Sec. Bureau, 132 Idaho 547, 548-49, 976 P.2d 473, 474- 
76 (1 999). 
Where one of the issues on appeal relates to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code 
$12-117 it necessarily involves some consideration of the underlying issue presented to the 
district court. Ralph Naylor Farms, 144 Idaho at 810, 172 P.3d at 1085. In this case, Smith has 
appealed under Idaho Code $12-1 17 as well as various other statutory provisions for attorney 
fees. Therefore, it will be necessary for the court to exercise a free, or de novo review of the 
underlying issues. Here, the underlying issue presented to the district court involved the 
County's interpretation of its code regarding the width of a private driveway. 
2. The County's Interpretation of its Ordinances Has a Reasonable Basis 
in Fact and Law. 
In reviewing requests for attorney fees and costs under Idaho Code $12-117, this Court 
has generally followed two lines of reasoning. First, this Court has held that where the agency, 
city or county has no authority to take a particular action, it acts without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law. Reardon v. Magic Yalley Sand and Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 120, 90 P.3d 340, 
345 (2004); see also, In re Estate of Elliott, 141 Idaho 177, 184, 108 P.3d 324, 331 (2005) 
(affkning an award of attorney fees where the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare 
presented an erroneous interpretation of an unambiguous statute and therefore acted without 
statutory authority in presenting its appeal); Moosman v. Idaho Horse Racing Commission, 117 
Idaho 949, 954, 793 P.2d 181, 186 (1990) (holding that the Commission had no authority to 
order the redistribution of a purse for violation of a rule and remanding to the district court for 
entry of an award of afforney fees for the plaintiff). However, this Court has also held that if an 
agency's actions are based upon a "reasonable, but erroneous interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute," then attorney fees should not be awarded. Ralph Naylor Farms, 144 Idaho at 809, 172 
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P.3d at 1084; Idaho Potato Comm h v. Russet Valley Produce, Inc., 127 Idaho 654, 661, 904 
It is not clear which line of cases the district court followed in this case. Its brief written 
Final Order stated: ".. .2. The defense of the case was not frivolous; 3. The State of Idaho does 
not follow the English rule; and 4. There is no contractual or applicable statute upon which to 
base attorney fees." (R. Vol.1 at 120-121). Similarly, the district court's verbal ruling provided: 
Idaho doesn't follow the English rule, it follows the American rule 
in which you get no attorney's fees unless provided for by statute 
or contract. Mr. Masingill correctly states that 12-117 and 12-120 
have both set forth a threshold on which one may secure fees. In 
this court's view they both rise to the level of frivolity, and there is 
no construction of these facts that I can find that the County 
defended frivolously in any means, it's just a matter of conhsion 
(inaudible). The application for attorney fees will be denied. 
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 37, lines 23-25, and Tr. Vol. 1, p. 38, lines 1-1 1). 
The central issue here is not whether the Board acted without authority or misinterpreted 
an unambiguous ordinance. Rather, the issue is the Commission and Board's interpretation of 
the WCC relating to the required width of a private driveway. The road width requirements for a 
driveway such as Smiths in Washington County are determined by the WCC or, if more 
stringent, by the local fire districts. Here, the Midvale Fire District provided more stringent 
requirements. At the beginning of Smith's application process, the Administrator required Smith 
to obtain a permit £rom the Midvale Fire District. When this was denied because the road Smith 
had already built to his barn was only sixteen (16') feet, Smith challenged the County's 
interpretation of its code.24 Smith disagreed with the fact that Midvale Fire District required 
24 AS set fo& previously, at some point in time, the County provided a printed interpretation of its code to Smith. 
Unfrortunately, neither this fact nor the contents of the handout is included in the Record on Appeal. 
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twenty (20') feet while Weiser and Cambridge required on sixteen (16') feet. Once the issue 
reached the Commission, it held two public hearings on the issue and during the second one, 
sought comment from two persons at the Midvale Fire District. 
When the issue proceeded to the Board for review, the Board sought an Attorney General 
opinion. Although the record does not include comment from those hearings and meetings, it is 
clear that the County did not just brush this under the carpet. It sought and relied on facts from 
the public and the Midvale Fire District. It interpreted its code the same way as it had done 
previously and even provided a handout of the interpretation. They sought an Attorney General 
opinion when their interpretation was questioned. All of these actions were reasonably based 
upon fact and law. 
The relevant WCC definition for a private driveway is found in section 5-2-1 wherein it 
defines "DRIVEWAY: A private lane sewing as access from a public road or street to no more 
than two (2) homes." WCC 5-2-1. (emphasis added). From there, a reading of the WCC leads 
to WCC 5-3-4.D which reads: "Access requirements are as follows: No building permit for a 
residence will be issued in any zone unless the private road or driveway serving the residence 
meets the standards of section 5-3-5 of this chapter." WCC 5-3-4.D. (Emphasis added). 
The fmal relevant section relating to driveways is found in WCC 5-3-5.B.2 which 
provides, "All private driveways serving two (2) houses shall have a recorded easement of at 
least twenty six feet (26') with twenty feet (20') of finished roadway meeting county or road 
district standards for road construction, excluding paving, or must meet standards of the fue 
department having jurisdiction, if more stringent." WCC 5-3-5B.2. This is the code section 
from which the central issue evolved because Smith, reading the section in the abstract, believed 
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that his existing driveway only served one house and therefore the code section did not apply to 
him. 
This Court construes a local ordinance as it construes a statute. Friends of Farm to 
Market, 137 Idaho at 196, 46 P.3d at 13. Statutory construction always begins with the literal 
language of the statute or ordinance. Id. at 197,46 P.3d at 14. If an ordinance is unambiguous, 
the Court need not consider rules of statutory construction and the statute will be given its plain 
meaning. Hamilton ex re!. Hamilton v. Reeder FIying Serv., 135 Idaho 568, 572, 21 P.3d 890, 
894 (2001); Cana!iNorcrest/Columbus Action Comm. v. City of Boise, 136 Idaho 666, 670, 39 
P.3d 606, 610 (2001). Where the language of a statute is ambiguous, this Court applies rules of 
construction for guidance. Friends of Farm to Market, 137 Idaho at 197, 46 P.3d at 14. 
Constructions that lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results are disfavored. Id. All sections 
of the applicable statute must be construed together to determine the legislative body's intent. Id. 
(citing Lockhart v. Dept. ofFish and Game, 121 Idaho 894, 897, 828 P.2d 1299, 1302 (1992)). 
Statutes and ordinances must be construed so as to give effect to all their provisions and not to 
render any part superfluous or insignificant. Id. (citing Brown v. Caldwell Sch. Dist. No. 132, 
127 Idaho 112,117,898 P.2d 43,48 (1995)). 
Over the years, the County has read the defmition of driveway and the only provision the 
WCC relating to private driveways together to mean that Smith's driveway needed to be twenty 
(20') feet under either the WCC provisions above or because it would be in the Midvale Fire 
District. Construing the code sections together in order to determine the County's intent does not 
lead to absurd or unreasonably harsh results in this matter. There is no proof in the record by 
Smith indicating that others in the Midvale Fire District did not have to build twenty (20') foot 
roads, only his claim that home owners in other fire Districts were only required to build sixteen 
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(16') foot roads. Moreover, the road width requirements imposed by the County and the 
Midvale Fire District are part and parcel of the governmental police power and do not 
unnecessarily infringe on Smith's right to develop his property. 
In summary, the County had a basis in fact and law for denying the building pennit 
because Smith did not obtain all the requirements for the building permit, namely approval &om 
the Midvale Fire District. The County also had a basis in fact and law for denying the variance 
because he did not prove his case for need of the variance, particularly because his own actions 
caused the need for the variance. 
Idaho case law supports the denial of attorney fees even where the board acts 
erroneously. In Payette River Property Owners Assn. v. Board of Commissioners of Valley 
County, a property owners association "sought judicial review of county board of commissioners' 
issuance, to developer, of conditional use permit for residential subdivision in flood-prone area" 
Payette River Property Owners Assn. v. Board of Commissioners of Valley County, 132 Idaho 
551, 551, 976 P.2d 477 (1999). This Court affinned the district court's decision in favor of the 
Association, because the first element of LC. 8 12-1 17, that the Association was the prevailing 
party was present. This Court continued, 
However, we hold that the second element of LC. 5 12-1 17 that the 
Board acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law, is not 
fulfilled. The Board, although erroneously interpreting the 1982 
Ordinance, examined the Ordinance and determined that the 
subdivision would be beneficial to the county. From the outset in 
1992, when the P & Z Commission issued the letter requesting 
additional information and permits from the Partnership, the 1982 
Ordinance was interpreted to allow for fill for subdivisions. The 
Board acted in a way that fairly. and reasonably addressed the 
issue. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err by 
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denying the Association's request for attorney fees under LC. 5 12- 
117 
Payette River Property Owners Assn. v. Board of Commissioners of Valley County, 132 Idaho 
551, 558, 976 P.2d 477 (1999). Here, there was a dispute about whether Smith's driveway 
served two houses or not. The Board's Findings of Fact and Amended Finding read as follows: 
Access to the property is a private road off Farm to Market 
Road. The access road is a private driveway. The private 
roadway serves two (2) houses for a portion of its length. 
Those houses are the applicant's house and the Lundin 
house. It then branches and for most of its length services 
only the applicant's house. 
(R. Vol.1 at 28 and 46). Smith also disputed the County's application of the Midvale Fire 
District's 20' road width requirement. The County attempted to resolve these issues by requiring 
Smith to seek a variance from the Midvale Fire District and by seeking the opinion of the Idaho 
Attorney General. Whether or not the County's interpretation of its ordinances could have been 
deemed erroneous, it certainly cannot be said that the County acted without a reasonable basis in 
attempting to resolve these unique issues. 
Finally, Smith argues that the district court was incorrect when it stated that the factors to 
be considered for awarding attorney fees under Idaho Code 512-117 and Idaho Code $12-12lZ5 
"rise to the level of frivolity." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 38, lines 5-6). Essentially, Smith asserts that the 
district court erred by mischaracterizing the standard for an award of attorney fees under each 
statute. Nevertheless, Mr. Masingill agreed that the standards were "pretty darn close" and that 
25 It is unclear whether the district court meant to also include Idaho Code $12-121 here or misspoke when citing 
Idaho Code $12-120. The district court does not cite any code sections in its written Order. Just prior to this 
statement by the district court, Mr. Masingill was not completely clear in his oral statements to the court: 'T think the 
most important issue is whether or not 12-21 - or 12-121 Idaho Code or 12-117 applies. And under two different 
standards, although they're pretty darn close, I think it comes down to whether or not the defendant had any basis 
in law or fact." (Tr. Vol. I, p. 35, fines 25 top. 36 line 5). 
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the primary concern was whether the County had any basis in law or fact for its decision. (Tr. 
Vol. 1, p. 36, lines 3). Moreover, while the district court may have blended the findings 
required, its ultimate conclusion-that the County's conduct did not rise to a level to warrant 
attorney fees-was correct. 
C. Smith Is Not Entitled To Attorney Fees Under Idaho Code 512-121 Because 
Attorney Fees Are Not Available In An Appeal From An Agency Decision 
And Because The County Did Not Defend Frivolously. 
1. Attorney Fees Are Not Available In An Appeal From An Agency 
Decision Because It Is Not A Civil Action. 
Smith's claim that he is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code 512-121 is without 
foundation and contrary to this Court's prior decisions. Idaho Code 5 12-121 allows an award of 
attorney fees in any "civil action." This Court has previously held that attorney fees are not 
available under Idaho Code 5 12-121 in a petition for judicial review because it does not 
constitute a "civil action." Lowery v. Board of County Comm'rs for Ada County, 117 Idaho 
1079, 1081, 793 P.2d 1251, 1253 (1990). The question here is whether Smith's Complaint 
requesting mandamus relief, which was ultimately turned into a petition for judicial review, 
constitutes a "civil a~tion."'~ 
Smith acknowledged that this case is hard to reconcile with those cases holding that 
attorney fees are not available under Idaho Code 5 12-121 in cases involving petitions for 
judicial review. See Johnson v. Blaine County, -- Idaho --, 204 P.3d 1127 (2009); Allen v. Blaine 
County, 131 Idaho 138,953 P.2d 578 (1998). The County submits that it cannot be reconciled. 
26 Preliminarily, should this Court agree that the district court erred in failing to dismiss Smith's Complaint, the 
issue of attorney fees necessarily becomes moot. 
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The fact that the district court sua sponte changed Smith's Complaint into a petition for 
judicial review was probably an alternative to dismissal of Smith's Complaint. The underlying 
issue in this case is the interpretation of a WCC provision regarding the width of a driveway for a 
house in the Midvale Fire District. Even though Smith filed a civil Complaint, the district court 
viewed the case as one for judicial review of an agency decision. Smith cannot "have his cake 
and eat it too." Although the district court did not state that it was denying Smith's attorney fees 
based on the holding of Allen and other similar cases, its decision was nevertheless correct 
because the case was perceived as a petition for judicial review. 
2. The County Did Not Defend Its Interpretation Of Its Code 
Frivolously. 
Attorney fees under Idaho Code $12-12lZ7 can be awarded only if the County defended 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without f~undation.'~ As stated above, the district court held that 
"there is no construction of these facts that I can find that the County defended frivolously in any 
means, it's just a matter of confusion (inaudible). The application for attorney fees will be 
denied." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 38, lines 6-1 1). 
In the recent case of Taylor v. Canyon County Board of Commissioners, 2009-ID- 
0610.102, this Court denied attorney fees at least in part because the issue before the Court was 
considered unique. This Conrt held, "[hlere, we are unable to fmd that the Vickers pursued this 
appeal frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation, especially in light of the unique issues 
27 Idaho Code $12-12lin pertinent part states: "In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to 
the prevailing party or parties,. . .The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person,. . .the state of Idaho 
or political subdivision thereof." 
IRCP 54(e)(l) in pertinent part states: "[Alttorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be awarded by the 
court only when it finds, ffom the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." 
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that were presented in this case." Taylor v. Canyon County Board of Commissioners, 2009-ID- 
0610.102 at p. 22. Perhaps the issue regarding the County's interpretation of its road width 
provisions was not unique, but the District Court found that the conflict between the County and 
Fire Disbict to be a "rare circumstance." 
Under these circumstances, the County went beyond its normal procedures in an effort to 
make the correct decision on Smith's issue. The County held at least two public hearings on this 
issue before the Commission, sought the opinion of the Midvale Fire District, and sought an 
opinion from the Attorney General. Once the A.G. opinion was received, the County reasonably 
defended their code which was backed by the attorney general. It can hardly be said that such a 
defense was frivolous, unreasonable, or without f~undat ion .~~ 
D. Smith Is Not Entitled To Costs Pursuant To Idaho Code $ 12-101 And IRCP 
54@)(1) Because The County. 
Costs under Idaho Code 5 12-101 in conjunction with IRCP 54(d)(l)(A) are 
discretionary. Even though Smith was the prevailing party in this case, the district court did not 
award costs.30 That decision was correct and should be affumed. 
E. The County Is Entitled To Attorney Fees And Costs On Appeal Pursuant To 
Idaho Code $12-117 And I.A.R. 40 And 41 
Should this Court agree with the County that attorney fees were properly denied Smith, 
the County requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code 512-1 17 and Rules 40 and 
41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. Idaho Code 512-1 17 authorizes attorney fees on appeal under 
29 Smith argues that he only has to prove one of the three elements of IRCP 54(e)(l). 
'O IRCP 54(d)(l)(A) reads: "Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as a matter of right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court." (emphasis 
added). 
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the two-part test applied by the District Court. Reardon, 140 Idaho at 120,90 P.3d at 345. The 
County satisfies the prevailing party prong of the test if it is successful in obtaining an 
affirmation of the District Court's denial of attorney fees. With respect to the second prong, the 
County submits that Smith presented an erroneous view of the County's decision. Therefore, the 
County requests the Court award it attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In sum, the district court correctly denied Smith's attorney fees when it ruled that the 
County did not defend frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. The County acted 
reasonably in interpreting its own ordinances as the same related to the Smith's application for a 
building permit and variance, and that interpretation was entitled to deference by the District 
Court. 
Respectfully submitted the day of August, 2009. 
Delton L. Walker 
Attorney for Washington County 
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